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Torts
By TRACEY GARLAND VINSON*
INTRODUCTION
The Survey will discuss two significant decisions' handed down
by the Kentucky appellate courts during the Survey period.' In the
first case to be discussed, the Kentucky Court of Appeals recog-
nized the tort of outrage as an independent cause of action.' The
Kentucky Supreme Court, in the other case this Survey will analyze,
* J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky, 1984. The author expresses her thanks
to Prof. Richard C. Ausness for his valuable advice in the preparation of this Survey.
I Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Craft v. Rice, No. 82-CA-1346-MR
(Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 1983), reported at 30 Ky. L. Summ. 11, at 2 (Ky. Ct. App. May
12, 1983) [hereinafter cited as KLS], discretionary rev. granted, 30 KLS 11, at 24 (Ky. Aug.
14, 1983).
1 The Survey period runs from July 1, 1982, through June 30, 1983. Other cases
of interest decided during this period but not discussed in this Survey include: Lexington
Herald-Leader Co. v. Graves, No. 81-SC-575-TG (Ky. Dec. 28, 1982) (reversing a libel
award, the Court applied the "actual malice" standard announced by the United States
Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and found no
actual malice on the somewhat convoluted facts); Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky.
1982) (unanimously upholding the Kentucky statutes of limitations, KRS §§ 413.120 and
413.135); Reans v. Stutler, 642 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1982) (reversing on evidentiary grounds
a $75,000 medical malpractice award for plaintiff and remanding the case for trial de novo.
The Court held: (l) it was reversible error to allow plaintiff's attorney to use leading ques-
tions with medical experts to present evidence in chief where witnesses were not shown to
have "a strong allegiance of interest" with plaintiff nor to be unwilling to testify; and (2)
it was abuse of the trial judge's discretion to prevent defense counsel from conferring with
his own witness during a break in the trial); Clements v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 657 S.W.2d
223 (Ky. 1983) (in litigation stemming from a gasoline fire, the Court, reversing an award
in a wrongful death action against all defendants except the immediately negligent party,
held that the duty of care does not require equipment to be the safest available, provided
such equipment is safe and would have prevented the injury complained of had it been used);
Paducah Area Pub. Library v. Terry, 655 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming a per-
sonal injury award for $983,456.57 against defendant Library, the court held: (1) "sudden
emergency" instruction not available where the emergency was caused by defendant's own
negligence; (2) admission of photographs taken soon after the accident was proper where
the pictures were of significant probative value in determining the extent of injuries; and
(3) tax impact is irrelevant to a jury considering the amount of damages to be awarded);
Johnson v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., No. 82-CA-944-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1983)
(inaccurate newspaper report indicating that plaintiff was arrested for trafficking in co-
caine would not support a claim for false light invasion of privacy where plaintiff was ac-
tually arrested for possession of cocaine).
I Craft v. Rice, No. 82-CA-1346-MR, slip op. at 5-8.
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ruled that the parents of a healthy child born after an unsuccessful
sterilization operation could not recover from the physician the
costs of rearing the child.4
I. OUTRAGE
More than forty years ago, Dean Prosser heralded the new tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress,' but at the same time
noted: "[T]he law has been reluctant, and very slow indeed, to
accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to independent legal
protection." 6 Kentucky has finally recognized this tort as an in-
dependent cause of action in the case of Craft v. Rice.7 This new
tort has been designated "outrage," ' and its parameters are defined
by section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
[Restatement] ."
Whether, and to what extent, to redress damages for emotional
distress has been the subject of much debate. 0 Emotional distress
goes by many names," and includes "all highly unpleasant men-
tal reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, em-
barrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea." "
Only under extreme circumstances, however, may liability arise.'3
For many years, courts denied recovery for emotional distress
as an independent tort. "' This reluctance was due to the difficulty
of proving and measuring damages.' 5 Damages stemming from
Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d at 863.
See Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L.
REv. 874 (1939).
Id. at 874.
' No. 82-CA-1346-MR, slip op. at 5-8.
' Id. at 5.
See id. at 7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
See, e.g., Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAjIF. L. REv. 40 (1956); Pros-
ser, supra note 5; Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944); Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting
Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1950).
" These include mental distress, mental anguish, shock, fright and mental suffer-
ing. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) comment j (1965).
12 Id.
13 Id.
1 Ausness, Kentucky Law Survey-Torts, 65 Ky. L.J. 301, 312 (1976-77); see also
Prosser, supra note 5, at 874-75.
11 "IT]he law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress [mental pain or anxiety]
when the unlawful act causes that alone ... though ... it is impossible a jury ... should
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emotional distress were thought to be too speculative,' 6 and courts
feared that recognition of such an ephemeral cause of action would
bring a deluge of trivial litigation.' 7 These fears have proved
groundless, and courts have gradually come to recognize emotional
distress as the basis for an independent cause of action.' 8
The Craft case arose from events surrounding the criminal trial
of one of the plaintiffs, Albert Craft, who was accused of falsify-
ing weigh tickets.' 9 Pending Albert's trial, Roy Rice, a former Boyd
County Sheriff, embarked upon a course of harassment directed
primarily at -Albert's wife, Irene Craft.20 Rice kept Irene under
surveillance, following her from home to work. He used the
citizen's band radio to threaten her, saying he would put Albert
in prison. On one occasion, Rice even used his own vehicle to force
Irene's car into oncoming lanes of traffic. About the same time,
the Crafts began to receive anonymous telephone calls. However,
Rice at no time physically touched Irene.2' Irene claimed that, as
a result of this harassment, she suffered chronic diarrhea, colitis,
a nervous condition and mental anguish. 22
The Boyd County Circuit Court dismissed the Crafts' claim on
the basis of the statute of limitations since it was filed more than
altogether overlook the feelings of the party." Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863
(1861).
,6 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971). However,
courts have never hesitated to award damages for physical pain, which can be equally
speculative. Id. Further, recovery has long been allowed for emotional distress when
accompanied by even slight physical injury, or when based on another tort, such as assault.
See, e.g., Brown v. Crawford, 177 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1943). "A lusty hug and a kiss were priced
at $700 ..... Magruder, supra note 10, at 1034, n.5 (citing Ragsale v. Ezell, 49 S.W. 775,
775 (Ky. 1899)). See also Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 193 S.E. 458 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1937) (being struck by a coin constituted sufficient injury to support recovery);
Liljegren v. United Rys., 227 S.W. 925 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921) (a kiss by a drunken railroad
passenger resulted in liability). It is difficult to see how damages in such cases would be
less speculative than damages based on outrage.
" See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at § 12, for a discussion of the arguments against
the tort of outrage.
" See id.
" Craft v. Rice, No. 82-CA-1346-MR, slip op. at 2. Craft was later acquitted of the
charges. Id.
20 Id. This behavior was continued for three months, May through July, 1978. Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. The court dismissed a claim by Albert Craft as "trivial," because only one
incident was alleged in which Rice had had contact with Albert Craft during the period,
and that contact had only been over a citizen's band radio. Id.
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a year after the alleged occurrences.23 The Kentucky Court of
Appeals found that plaintiffs had established a "right to be left
alone and free from outrageous conduct." 24 The court went on to
state that since the "criminal law provides penalties for harassment
in Kentucky Revised Statute [(KRS) section] 525.70 . . . there
should be a corresponding tort for this type of conduct. ' 25 The
court concluded that the Crafts' claim was barred by the one year
statute of limitations set forth in KRS section 413.140,26 because
outrage is a personal injury. 27 The court could have avoided
recognition of outrage as a cause of action simply by affirming the
trial court's finding that the statute of limitations had run against
the plaintiffs. However, the court of appeals was careful to
recognize the tort, adopting the language of the Restatement and
defining the type of injury involved before dismissing the claim. 28
This strongly suggests that a future plaintiff with a timely claim
meeting the requirements set forth by the court will be able to
recover.
With the Craft decision, Kentucky joined an increasing
majority of jurisdictions in recognizing the tort of outrage, 29 and
11 Id., slip op. at 3.
24 Id., slip op. at 7.
25 Id. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 525.070 (Bobbs-Merrill 1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS]
provides:
Harassment.-(l) A person is guilty of harassment when with intent to harass,
annoy or alarm another person he:
(a) Strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects him to physical contact or
attempts or threatens to do the same; or
(b) In a public place, makes an offensively coarse utterance, gesture or
display, or addresses abusive language to any person present; or
(c) Follows a person in or about a public place or places; or
(d) Engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm
or seriously annoy such person and which serve no legitimate purpose.
(2) Harassment is a violation.
26 KRS § 413.140 (Bobbs-Merrill 1974).
27 Craft v. Rice, No. 82-CA-1346-MR, slip op. at 8 (citing Carr v. Texas E. Transmis-
sion Corp., 344 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1961); Columbia Mining Co. v. Walker, 271 S.W.2d 276
(Ky. 1954)).
25 See Craft v. Rice, No. 82-CA-1346-MR, slip op. at 5-8.
29 To date at least 36 states, including Kentucky, have recognized intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress as an independent tort. See American Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon,
394 So. 2d 361 (Ala. 1980); Watts v. Golden Age Nursing Home, 619 P.2d 1032 (Ariz.
1980); Counce v. M.B.M. Co., 597 S.W.2d 92 (Ark. 1979); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n
v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952); Rugg v. McCarty, 476 P.2d 753 (Colo. 1970); Urban
v. Hartford Gas Co., 93 A.2d 292 (Conn. 1952); Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070
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departed from the position historically taken by Kentucky courts.30
Previously, plaintiffs were denied recovery for emotional distress
except where "accompanied by a direct, contemporaneous physical
contact or injury.' This requirement, known as the impact rule,
has been much criticized by commentators and the courts.32 It has
been rejected by most jurisdictions in cases of intentionally caused
emotional distress33 and is being eroded in cases of negligently in-
flicted emotional distress.3" Application of the impact rule has led
(D.C. 1980); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sheehan, 373 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Whitmire v. Woodbury, 267 S.E.2d 783 (Ga. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 271 S.E.2d
491 (1980); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 606 P.2d 944 (Idaho 1980); Public
Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 360 N.E.2d 765 (Ill. 1976); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa
1976); Wiehe v. Kukal, 592 P.2d 860 (Kan. 1979); Steadman v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co.,
362 So. 2d 1144 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148
(Me. 1979); Richey v. American Auto Ass'n, 406 N.E.2d 675 (Mass. 1980); Fry v. Ionia
Sentinel-Standard, 300 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc.,
612 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Paasch v. Brown, 227 N.W.2d 402 (Neb. 1975); Star
v. Rabello, 625 P.2d 90 (Nev. 1981); Hume v. Bayer, 428 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1981); Fischer v. Maloney, 373 N.E.2d 1215 (N.Y. 1978); Dickens v. Puryear, 276
S.E.2d 325 (N.C. 1981); Breeden v. League Servs. Corp., 575 P.2d 1374 (Okla. 1978); Tur-
man v. Central Billing Bureau, Inc., 568 P.2d 1382 (Or. 1977); Mullen v. Suchko, 421 A.2d
310 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.E.2d 776 (S.C. 1981); First Nat'l Bank
v. Bragdon, 167 N.W.2d 381 (S.D. 1969); Moorhead v. J.C. Penney Co., 555 S.W.2d 713
(Tenn. 1977); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961); Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431
(Vt. 1978); Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1974); Phillips v. Hardwick, 628 P.2d
506 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. 'Va. 1978);
Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 292 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. 1980).
11 For a plenary discussion of the history of recovery for infliction of emotional
distress in Kentucky, see Ausness, supra note 14, at 311-21.
1' Id. at 317. Recovery was generally contingent upon the finding of some other tort,
to which emotional distress damages were then appended. See, e.g., Southern Express Co.
v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612, 615 (1916) ("[M]ere mental pain and anxiety are too vague for legal
redress where no injury is done to person, property, health or reputation."). See also Brown
v. Crawford, 177 S.W.2d at I (recovery based on assault). Most decisions insisted on the
presence of a recognized cause of action, although it was obvious that damage from that
source was minor, and that the emotional damages were the primary reason for bringing
the action.
32 See, e.g., American Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d at 362-65; W. PROSSER,
supra note 16, at § 55; Ausness, supra note 14, at 318-21.
" See American Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d at 365; M.B.M. Co. v. Counce,
596 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Ark. 1980); George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Mass.
1971); Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 36 S.E.2d 475, 480 (W. Va. 1945); Lambert,
Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries: Overview and Update, PERS. INJ. ANNUAL 539, 544-54
(1979), reprinted from 37 J.A. TRIAL L. Am. (1978); 38 AM. JUR. 2d Fright, Shock and
Mental Disturbance § 5 (1968).
" See, e.g., Dziokowski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Schultz v.
Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 1983); Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84
(Pa. 1970).
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to some anomalous results. In one case, a plaintiff who witnessed
two men beat her husband was able to recover against the one who
pushed her aside, but not against the other, who did not touch
her. 5 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in adopting the language
of Restatement section 46(1), has found a more intelligent solu-
tion to the problem of when to allow emotional distress recovery. 6
Section 46(1) recognizes the right to be free from emotional distress,
identifies the interest protected, and defines the conduct which will
violate that interest and expose defendant to liability.37 To be ac-
tionable, there must be extreme and outrageous conduct38 which
intentionally or recklessly39 causes severe emotional distress" to the
plaintiff.4
1
Not all conduct which is intended to cause emotional distress
will subject the actor to liability. Only that conduct which is "so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community"42 will be
actionable. Thus, no liability will lie for petty insults or indignities.
The law cannot, and should not, redress all "the slings and arrows
of outrageous fortune."4 3
The Kentucky Court of Appeals found that Roy Rice's
conduct4 toward Irene Craft fit the Restatement definition." Other
courts have found a sufficient showing of outrageous conduct 6 in
" See McGee v. Vanover, 147 S.W. 742 (Ky. 1912).
36 See Ausness, supra note 14, at 320-21.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965), states: "Outrageous Conduct Caus-
ing Severe Emotional Distress (1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo-
tional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." (em-
phasis added).
" RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46(1) comments d-g (1965).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) comments a, i (1965).
, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) comments j, k (1965).
4, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965) concerns conduct directed at a
third person. This portion was not adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. See Craft
v. Rice, No. 82-CA-1346-MR, slip op. at 7-8.
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) comment d.
11 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, scene 1.
" See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
" See Craft v. Rice, No. 82-CA-1346-MR, slip op. at 2.




instances of extreme and continuous verbal abuse toward plaintiff,17
threats to beat up plaintiff if he did not give up his business,' and
threatening a woman with the murder of her husband, and then
carrying out the threat.49 The outrageous character of the conduct
may arise from or be amplified by abuse of position 0 or from
knowledge of plaintiff's peculiar susceptibility to emotional
distress."s However, a defendant will not be liable for insisting upon
his legal rights in a permissible manner.5 2
Section 46 of the Restatement applies only to emotional distress
which is inflicted intentionally or recklessly." Thus, a defendant
will only be liable where he or she "desires to inflict severe emo-
tional distress, and also where he knows that such distress is cer-
tain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct. ' 54 Rice's
conduct was found by the court of appeals to be an intentional
effort to inflict emotional distress on Irene Craft. 5
To support recovery, the emotional distress inflicted must be
4' See Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977).
" See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d at 282, noted in Kalven,
Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 194-96 (1965).
, See Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157 (Ill. 1961).
" RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS 46(1) comment e. See also Johnson v. Samp-
son, 208 N.W.814 (Minn. 1926); Note, Torts: An Analysis of Mental Distress as an Ele-
ment of Damages and as a Basis of an Independent Cause of Action When Intentionally
Caused, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 106, 114 (1980).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment f (1965). See also Nickerson v.
Hodges, 84 So. 37 (La. 1920) (defendants preyed on the peculiarities of a mentally defi-
cient elderly woman).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment g (1965).
" RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 comments a, i (1965). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965) (definition of reckless). Recklessness may be found
either from the defendant's knowledge of potential harm to another or from the failure
to appreciate the potential harm where a reasonable person would. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 500 comment a (1965).
'4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment i (1965).
" Craft v. Rice, No. 82-CA-1346-MR, slip op. at 5. Because the Crafts appealed from
a directed verdict, their allegations must be taken as true. Id., slip op. at 3. An example
of reckless conduct was found where defendant circulated a false report that plaintiff's son
had hanged himself, knowing that plaintiff was likely to hear the rumor. See Bielitski v.
Obadiak, 61 D.L.R. 494 (Sask. 1921). See also Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir.
1961) (reckless advice concerning insurance), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962); Savage v.
Boies, 272 P.2d 349 (Ariz. 1954) (false representation, for the purpose of accomplishing
an arrest, that plaintiff's child was hurt); Delta Fin. Co. v. Ganakas, 91 S.E.2d 383 (Ga.
1956) (collection agent threatened child, who was home alone, with arrest and jail if she
did not open the door).
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severe.5 6 Although the Restatement does not require bodily harm
or injury,57 physical manifestations may afford evidence that the
distress indeed exists and that it is severe.58 The emotional trauma
experienced by Irene Craft, resulting as it did in medically verifiable
manifestations, was found to be of a sufficient severity to satisfy
this requirement. 9 The degree of outrageousness will also be con-
sidered evidence of mental anguish,60 as where a mother and her
severely injured ten month old baby were sent out into subfreez-
ing weather,' or where a premature infant who had died shortly
after birth was placed in a gallon jar of formaldehyde and displayed
to the mother. 62 These fact situations would almost certainly cause
emotional distress "so severe that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it." '63
In recognizing outrage, the court of appeals has taken a step
toward a more fair resolution of emotional distress claims. The sen-
sible guidelines of the Restatement, strictly adhered to, should pre-
vent recovery on meritless claims.' The Supreme Court has granted
discretionary review in Craft v. Rice. 5 However, because the deci-
sion of the court of appeals is conceptually sound, the Kentucky
Supreme Court should approve it.
II. WRONGFUL BIRTH
A. Schork v. Huber
In Schork v. Huber,6 6 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
the parents of a normal, healthy child born after an unsuccessful
sterilization operation could not recover from the physician the
56 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment k (1965).
$ Id.
,' See Craft v. Rice, No. 82-CA-1346-MR, slip op. at 5.
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
6 See Rockhill v. Pollard, 485 P.2d 28 (Or. 1971).
62 See Johnson v. Woman's Hosp., 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
64 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 312, 313, 436, 436A (1965). In addition,
a clear and convincing proof standard might be imposed upon plaintiffs to discourage
specious claims.
65 30 KLS 11, at 24.
66 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1982).
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costs of rearing the child.67 In 1977, plaintiff Sharon Schork under-
went a sterilization procedure which her physician, defendant Dr.
Charles Huber, assured her was "99 percent effective in prevent-
ing pregnancy." 68 On a follow-up visit, Huber advised Sharon that
she was indeed sterile. Shortly after this, Sharon experienced what
she thought was a miscarriage and returned to Huber. He reassured
her that the sterilization had been successful,69 although he per-
formed no tests at this time to determine whether Sharon was in
fact sterile. 0 Some months later Schork discovered that she was
pregnant. She delivered a normal, healthy baby boy in 1978.1'
Following the birth of this unplanned son, the Schorks brought
a malpractice suit against Huber. They claimed damages for the
direct birth costs of pain and suffering, medical expenses and lost
wages. 72 This portion of the complaint was not dismissed. 73 The
plaintiffs also sought to recover damages for the cost of raising
the child, for disruption of family life and for mental suffering.
The trial court granted a partial summary judgment dismissing this
latter part of the complaint,7" and the court of appeals affirmed.75
In affirming the decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court stated that "parents cannot recover damages based on the
costs of raising a healthy but unexpected child from a doctor
following an unsuccessful sterilization procedure. 76 The Court
stated five reasons for its position. First, the parents of a normal,
67 Id. at 863.
68 Id. at 862.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 863 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
,' Id. at 862.
Id. at 864 (Liebson, J., dissenting). The elements of pain and suffering, medical
expenses and lost wages will be referred to collectively as direct birth costs throughout the
balance of this discussion.
73 Id.
14 Id. at 863-64.
71 Id. at 864.
76 Id. at 862. Justices Liebson and Vance dissented. Justice Liebson, in a lengthy dis-
sent, stated that the costs of raising an unwanted child born after a negligent sterilization
should be recoverable in damages "as a natural and probable consequence of the act of
negligence." Id. at 865 (Liebson, J., dissenting). He further disagreed with the majority's
assessment of public policy. "The duty of this court is to follow public policy, not to for-
mulate it." Id. at 864 (Liebson, J., dissenting). Justice Vance, also dissenting, would in
addition have awarded the damages sought for mental distress, which Justice Liebson would
have denied due to a lack of impact on the plaintiff. Id. at 867 (Vance, J., dissenting).
TORTS
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healthy child have not suffered any injury or damage. 77 Second,
the benefits of parenthood outweigh any economic burden.78 Third,
the Court believed that the injury claimed was too remote and
speculative to support an award of damages. 79 Fourth, the Court
found that the parents in Schork failed to mitigate their alleged
damages.80 Finally, the Court concluded that recovery for such
damages contravenes public policy. 8
Although causes of action for wrongful birth have been main-
tained as a type of medical malpractice in Kentucky,82 the issue
of whether child rearing costs are recoverable as an element of
damages in wrongful birth cases had not, prior to the Schork case,
been before the Kentucky Supreme Court. This issue, however, had
been decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Maggard v.
McKelvey." The Maggard court held that, although an unwanted
child was a foreseeable consequence of a negligently-performed
sterilization:
[I]t is in society's best interests to hold physicians to a standard
of professional competence and impose liability when they are
negligent in treating their patients. But to hold a doctor respon-
sible for the support of a mistakenly conceived child takes him
well beyond the scope of his duty to his patient, as commonly
" Id. at 862.
7S Id.
" Id. at 862, 863.
80 Id. at 862 ("[I]n a pure legal sense the parents have failed to mitigate the damages
which they charge.")(emphasis added). The Court failed to state exactly how the parents
might have mitigated their damages. See text accompanying note 158 infra.
Id.
8 See, e.g., Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971) (directed verdict in favor
of a defendant physician who performed allegedly negligent vasectomy held erroneous, on
grounds that a jury question was presented on the issue of negligence); Tomlinson v. Siehl,
459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970) (dismissal of complaint reversed; held that statute of limita-
tions did not begin to run until the discovery of the pregnancy); Maggard v. McKelvey,
627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that if negligence could be proven physician
would be liable for direct birth costs). See also Bennett v. Graves, 557 S.W.2d 893 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1977) (no recovery allowed for birth of ninth child following unsuccessful steriliza-
tion where no negligence was found).
" 627 S.W.2d at 44. The facts in Maggard were less favorable to the plaintiff than
the facts of Schork. In Maggard, the plaintiff Jerry Maggard failed to return after a
vasectomy for the complete series of semen tests which defendant Dr. McKelvey had ordered.
Id. at 46.
84 Id. at 47.
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thought of by both the lay public and the medical profession.
Public policy can, and in this instance does, cut off the legal
responsibility of the physician, even though he may have been
negligent and the injured be innocent. Without a clear expres-
sion of public opinion, some indication from the legislature or
an interpretation by our Supreme Court to the contrary, we con-
clude that our public policy prohibits the extension of liability
to include these damages."'
Therefore, damages were limited to those "incidental to the
pregnancy and birth, such as pain and suffering, loss of consor-
tium, medical and hospital expenses, and loss of wages."" Mag-
gard was cited with approval by the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Schork.87
B. Wrongful Birth in Other Jurisdictions
Wrongful birth and its disfavored counterpart, wrongful life,
although similar in nature, are distinct torts." Wrongful birth
claims brought under contractual theories have met with limited
success.8 9 Courts have been reluctant to impose implied warran-
ties of success on the physician, because even a non-negligent pro-
* Id. at 48.
, Id. at 49.
" Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d at 862.
* For comparisons of these torts, see Hold, Wrongful Pregnancy, 33 S.C.L. REy.
759 (1982); Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic
Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. Rsv. 713 (1982); Comment, Wrongful Birth
and Wrongful Life: Questions of Public Policy, 88 Loy. L. REv. 77 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Wrongful Birth]; Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of Action-
-Suggestions for a Consistent Analysis, 63 MAQ. L. REv. 611 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Suggestions for a Consistent Analysis]. For a complete discussion of the terminology, see
Comment, "WrongfulLife". The Right Not to be Born, 54 Tot. L. Ray. 480, 483-85 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as "Wrongful Life"].
88 See, e.g., Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982) (cause of action
based on expressed and implied warranties had acceptable legal theory which would allow
plaintiff to recover if allegations were proven). Cf. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975) (any warranty must be supported by independent consideration).
For other cases in which plaintiffs have alleged breach of warranty, see Jackson v.
Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Rogala v. Silva, 305 N.E.2d 571 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1973); Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d at 377; Green v. Sudakin, 265 N.W.2d
411 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); Sala v. Tomlinson, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (App. Div. 1979); Baldwin
v. Sanders, 223 S.E.2d 602 (S.C. 1976).
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cedure does not guarantee sterility." At least one court has refused
to recognize a wrongful birth cause of action based on breach of
an express or implied warranty."
In wrongful birth actions, recognized in many jurisdictions, 9
the parents claim that the child should not have been born at all,
and that they are damaged because a doctor's negligence caused
a child to be born.93 A wrongful life action is brought by the in-
fant claiming that its very existence is wrongful and that had defen-
dant not been negligent plaintiff would not exist.94 The overwhelm-
9" See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d at 8; Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d
at 377.
Pregnancy occurs after sterilization procedures once in 2,000 cases following ligation,
and once in 50 cases following the Pomeroy method used when sterilization is done at
Caesarean section. Spontaneous recanalization occurs in less than 1% of vasectomized males.
R. BENSON, HANDBOOK OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 445 (5th ed. 1974).
1, See Sala v. Tomlinson, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 508 ("New York does not recognize a cause
of action based upon breach of warranty arising out of the performance of services.").
11 See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628
S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982); Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967); Anonymous
v. Hospital, 366 A.2d 204 (Conn. 1976); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d at 503; Mag-
gard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d at 44; Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Kingsbury v. Smith,
442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Bowman v. Davis,
356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976); Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974);
Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975);
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
91 See Robertson, Damages for the Birth of a Child-Some Possible Policy Barriers,
23 MEDICINE, SCIENCE & Tim LAw 2 (1983); Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15, 19 n.4 (1978).
" A full discussion of the wrongful life concept is plainly beyond the confines of
this Survey. However, the question of whether a cause of action should be allowed for
wrongful life is a fascinating one which, due in part to its emotion charged nature, has
inspired much comment. See, e.g., Tedeschi, Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life," 7 J. FAII.
L. 465 (1967); Trotzig, The Defective Child and The Actions for Wrongful Life and
Wrongful Birth, 14 FAM. L.Q. 15 (1980); Comment, Park v. Chessin: The Continuing
Judicial Development of the Theory of "Wrongful Life," 4 Am. J. OF LAW & MED. 211
(1978-79); Comment, Wrongful Life: Should The Cause of Action be Recognized? 70
KY. L.J. 163 (1981-82).
The concept of wrongful life has also been a fertile source of litigation. See, e.g., Turpin
v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477 (Ct. App. 1980); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Berman v.
Allan, 404 A.2d at 8; Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967). At least one com-
mentator has noted that the same fact situation can produce a case wherein the parents
are allowed a cause of action while the child is not. See Wrongful Birth, supra note 88,
at 88-89. In this context, compare Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980)
(Phillips I) with Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1980) (Phillips II).
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ing majority of courts have rejected wrongful life as a viable cause
of action. 9
The wrongful birth cause of action has a relatively brief
history.96 Until recently, such cases were rather rare." However,
these suits are fast reaching epidemic proportions. Approximately
sixty wrongful birth decisions have been published, with roughly
one-third of that number occurring in the last five years.98 This
dramatic increase is attributable at least in part to the growing
number of contraceptive sterilization procedures being performed
each year. 99 Obstetricians and gynecologists, the members of the
medical profession who perform sterilization surgery, are ten times
more likely to be sued than most other physicians.' 00 Although
complete assurance of permanent sterility is virtually impossible,'0 '
when a healthy child0 2 arrives unexpectedly the parents may seek
redress against an allegedly negligent physician.'0 3
The large volume of wrongful birth litigation has unfortunately
"' California and Washington have recognized limited actions for wrongful life. See
Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d at 954; Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d at 483.
96 The first wrongful birth case was Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620 (Minn.
1934).
" For a good historical development of the wrongful birth cause of action, see Com-
ment, Suggestions for a Consistent Analysis, supra, note 88 at 623-30.
" See Note, Wrongful Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. CIN. L. REV.
65, 65 (1981).
19 Appelson, "Wrongful Birth" Suits on the Rise, 67 A.B.A. J. 1255, 1255 (1981).
100 Id.
101 See BENSON, supra note 90, at 445; Robertson, Civil Liability Arising from
"Wrongful Birth" Following an Unsuccessful Sterilization Operation, 4 AMERICAN J. LAW
& MED. 131, 139 (1978-79).
"I This Survey is limited to a discussion of what damages are available for the birth
of a healthy child, the fact situation presented by Schork. However, the issues are substan-
tially the same whether the child is born healthy or handicapped, since the negligent steriliza-
tion procedure leads only to the birth and not the handicap. In this context, care must be
taken to distinguish wrongful birth cases (child should not have been born) from cases which
seek damages for tortious prenatal injury.
"I' Most wrongful birth actions name the physician who performed the sterilization
procedure as a defendant. A notable exception to this trend is Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d
511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971), in which an action was brought against a pharmacist who
negligently filled plaintiff's prescription for birth control pills with a tranquilizer. In addi-
tion to negligent sterilization and negligent dispensation of oral contraceptives, the ques-
tion of liability for the birth of a child has arisen in at least three other factual contexts:
(I) denial of an abortion, either by misdiagnosis of pregnancy or failure to reveal facts which
would have led one to seek an abortion; (2) unsuccessful abortion; and (3) negligent genetic
counseling. See Robertson, supra note 101, at 134-35.
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failed to produce any sort of judicial consensus.' 0 4 As the New
Hampshire Supreme Court observed: "[T]he outlines of the duty
are much more apparent than the remedy which society chooses
to provide."' 5 Most courts recognize a cause of action, but
disagree sharply on the question of damages. 06 Some courts allow
damages for raising the child because child rearing costs are a
foreseeable result of defendant's negligence,' 0 7 while other courts
deny this recovery for reasons of public policy or deference to the
legislature.' 8 As one court has noted, no present method of award-
ing damages is completely satisfactory.'09
Wrongful birth is a malpractice action, requiring the familiar
tort elements of duty, a breach of duty which is the proximate cause
of the injury and an actual loss or injury."I0 Plaintiff must prove
all of these elements in order to recover.' Thus, if the physician
is negligent in performing the sterilization," 2 and because of this
negligence the plaintiff is injured by an unwelcome pregnancy,,'3
the physician must pay the damages occasioned by the pregnancy,
unless sufficient policy reasons exist to deny those damages. "' The
complicating factor in computing damages in a wrongful birth
cause of action is that damages have been occasioned by the crea-
tion of a new human life." 5
See Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d at 569.
,o' Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d at 1004.
,o6 For a lively debate on damages among the justices of one court, see Mason v.
Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d at 974.
10 See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977) ("[A]
growing majority of courts have allowed recovery for all damages proximately caused by
the physician's negligence, including the cost of rearing the child during his minority.").
,o See, e.g., Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d at 47-48.
109 Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d at 570.
11 See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d at 720; Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d at 960;
W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 30, at 143.
W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 38, at 208-09.
" Four possible occasions where negligence might occur in sterilization cases are: (1)
preoperative counseling, obtaining informed consent; (2) performance of operation; (3)
postoperative testing; and (4) postoperative counseling. Robertson, supra note 101, at 139-44.
",' Sexual intercourse is foreseeable and should not be considered a bar to recovery
as an intervening cause. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463-64 (S.D.W.Va. 1967)
("The part played by Mr. Bishop in bringing about this condition does not, in our opinion,
amount to an intervening cause.").
"' See, e.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (Wis. 1974);
Comment, Suggestions for a Consistent Analysis, supra note 88, at 623-30.
"' It may prove helpful for purposes of analysis to mentally separate the child from
the costs of rearing the child. Quite apart from the costs of his or her raising, the fact that
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In the struggle to reach a just measure of damages, courts have
arrived at four different positions: (1) allowing no damages;' 6 (2)
allowing recovery only for the direct birth costs; ' 7 (3) allowing
recovery for the direct birth costs plus child rearing costs offset
by an allowance for the benefits of parenthood; ' I and (4) com-
plete recovery of child rearing costs with no offset.' 9 The discus-
sion which follows will address the reasoning and compare the
beneficial and detrimental aspects of each of these positions.
1. No Damages
A few courts have held that a plaintiff is not entitled to
damages for wrongful birth in the case of an unsuccessful
sterilization.' 2 The rationale is that the birth of a child is a bless-
ing, and as such cannot be the occasion for damages. "[Tihe plain-
tiff has been blessed with the [birth] of another child. The expenses
alleged are incident to the bearing of a child" and therefore can
not be recovered.' 2' Ball v. Mudge'22 affirmed a jury decision that
the child exists harms no one. This is the factor with which the courts are struggling. See,
e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d at 571. As a practical matter one cannot separate the
child from the costs.
336 See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. at 620.
"' These would include pain and suffering, medical expenses and lost wages. See
Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003. Some courts also allow damages for emotional distress.
See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d at 721. But see Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d
496, 509 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) ("the emotional anguish that [the parents] suffer may be
a normal, uncompensable price one pays for being a parent").
"' See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d at 517-18; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d at 176.
,,9 See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477; Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 425
N.E.2d 968, 970 (I11. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd, 447 N.E.2d 385 (111. 1983), cert. denied sub
non. Raja v. Michael Reese Hosp., 52 U.S.L.W. 3248 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1983) (No. 83-17).
In reversing the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court took the position that the birth
of a normal, healthy child could not be considered a compensable wrong and so child rearing
costs should be disallowed. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d at 389. The dissent,
however, pointed out: "It is not at all that human life or the state of parenthood are in-
herently injurious, rather it is an unplanned parenthood and an unwanted birth ... at-
tributable to the physician's negligence for which the plaintiffs seek compensation." Id.
at 392 (Clark, J., dissenting).
"I See Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. at 620; Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d 201 (Wash.
1964). See also Comment, Liability for Failure of Birth Control Methods, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 1187, 1197 (1976).
'2 Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. at 622.
122 391 P.2d at 201.
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the parents were not damaged by the birth of the healthy infant,
who they would neither consider placing for adoption, nor "sell
for $50,000," even though the child was unplanned and
unwanted. 123
That no damages should be awarded in cases of wrongful birth
appears unrealistic and indefensible. Pregnancy and childbirth, even
absent complications, are painful and expensive, both in terms of
actual medical costs incurred and in terms of the mother's lost
earnings. The average cost of a normal pregnancy and delivery,
including a two day hospital stay, is approximately $2,250. Should
a Caesarean section be required or should other complications
develop, that figure could rise to $10,000 or more.124 Obviously,
such costs could be devastating to a family with limited means and
without medical insurance. Further, failure to recognize the cause
of action would not serve to encourage a high standard of pro-
fessional conduct and expertise in the family planning area.'25
2. Recovery for Direct Birth Costs Only
A number of courts allow the parents of a healthy child born
after a negligent sterilization procedure to recover the direct birth
costs,'26 but will not allow recovery of child rearing costs for policy
reasons.'27 This approach is founded on the premise that a nor-
mal, healthy life would not be considered a wrong.' 28 "Courts de-
nying recovery [of child rearing costs] because of 'public policy'
121 Id. at 204.
'21 Figures courtesy of Dr. Carey T. Vinson, Fayette County Health Department. While
the figures represent only approximate costs of pregnancies and deliveries in Lexington,
Kentucky, Dr. Vinson stated that the figures are comparable to costs in most other regions
of the country.
121 See Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d at 1005.
' See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d at 718; Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d
at 568; Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (costs awarded for
"wrongful pregnancy"), aff'd, 349 A.2d at 8; Wilczynski v. Goodman, 391 N.E.2d 479
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d at 288. Jurisdictions differ as to
what may be included in birth costs. Aside from medical and hospital expenses, courts have
allowed damages for medical expenses associated with the unsuccessful sterilization opera-
tion, lost wages due to pregnancy and childbirth, mental anguish and pain and suffering.
See generally Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757; Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003.
117 See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d at 12.




are bothered by the idea that a normal, healthy life should be the
basis for a compensable wrong.'" 29
A public policy issue has been raised in almost every wrongful
birth action.' 31 Courts denying child rearing costs state that the
benefits of having a healthy child should, as a matter of law,
outweigh any economic loss caused by raising the child;' 3 ' such
damages would impose an unreasonable burden on defendant
physicians and are out of proportion to their culpability; 32 allowing
such damages would encourage fraudulent claims;'3 3 and, such
damages create the possibility of future emotional harm to the child
involved.' 34
Courts which espouse the overriding benefits theory' 3 hold,
as a matter of law, that an additional child is always a net benefit
to its parents.' 36 However, in today's society children are a con-
siderable added expense to the family. According to the United
States Department of Agriculture figures, a baby born in 1982 will
cost his or her parents $89,720 by the time he or she reaches 18
years of age.' 37 The benefits of child rearing, on the other hand,
are intangible.'3 8 "[A] child's smile or the parental pride in a child's
achievement"'' 39 are wonderful indeed. Thus, although the costs
of raising a child may be an economic injury to the parent, some
W ilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d at 571.
130 Note, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by Judicial Fiat, 13
VAL. U.L. REv. 127, 138-45 (1978).
" This is sometimes referred to as the "overriding benefit" theory. See Robertson,
supra note 101, at 149-50. This is not to be confused with the so called "benefits rule"
of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 921 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes
149-54 infra.
"I See White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Kan. 1981); Note, Judicial
Limitations on Damages Recoverable For the Wrongful Birth of a Healthy Infant, 60 VA.
L. REv. 1311, 1318 (1982).
"' See Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d at 244.
114 This has been termed the "emotional bastard" theory. See Boone v. Mullendore,
416 So. 2d at 722; Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d at 570; Note, supra note 132, at 1329.
"I See Note, supra note 132, at 1316. "The birth of a healthy child and the joy and
pride in rearing that child are benefits which carry no price tag. This joy far outweighs
any economic loss that might be suffered by the parents." Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.
2d at 722.
16 See Note, supra note 132, at 1316.
,' Bringing Up A Child Now Costs $80,000, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1982, at B4, col. 10.
"' See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied,




courts have concluded that policy considerations require the denial
of child rearing costs.' 40
The strongest consideration for rejecting the award of child
rearing costs is that an award for damages to raise a child would
impose an unreasonable burden on the defendant physician, which
is wholly out of proportion to his or her culpability." Although
allowing recovery of child rearing costs as an element of damages
encourages risk spreading through increased use of medical
malpractice insurance, the cost to all consumers of medical services
would be increased if such damages were allowed. Further,
"recognizing such 'a tort' and the damages urged would . . .
discourage the legitimate practitioners from performing these
[sterilization] procedures for fear they may be inundated by such
claims."' Since states have evinced an interest both in keeping
medical costs at an affordable level' 3 and in assuring that con-
traceptive services are available to the public,' these policy con-
siderations appear to be legitimate.
Another policy consideration cited by courts for denying
recovery of child rearing costs is the fear that the child will suffer
future emotional damage.' 5 This theory, sometimes referred to as
the "emotional bastard" theory,' 6 suggests that the child will be
emotionally damaged upon learning of the wrongful birth action
by his or her parents.'4 7 On the other hand, in wrongful birth suits,
as in cases involving the family in general, protecting the welfare
,"I See Note, supra note 130, at 129 (citing Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219
N.W.2d at 244).
"' See Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d at 291.
Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 121 (Pa. 1981) (Nix, J., concurring). In this con-
text it is important to note that some courts have recognized a cause of action for wrongful
birth and limited recovery to direct birth costs, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d at
718, while others, like the court in Speck, speak of "denying" a cause of action for wrongful
birth but allowing recovery for the direct birth costs. 439 A.2d at 121. See also Schork v.
Huber, 648 S.W.2d at 861. The practical effect is the same.
'' See Note, supra note 130, at 139.
114 See Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
" See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d at 173.
46 See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d at 722; Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d at 570;
Robertson, supra note 101, at 153.
"' See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d at 722. "[A] child is less likely to become
an 'emotional bastard' when he may have some vague notion that his parents' family plan-
ning scheme went astray, than when he discovers that he is a 50,000 dollar judicially declared
burden." Bryan, Damages-The Not So "Blessed Event, "' 46 N.C.L. REv. 948, 952 (1968).
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of the child is of paramount importance, and it may be better to
provide means for the parents to raise an unplanned child, even
if this runs the risk of emotional damage to the child at a later
date. ' 41 Thus, viable arguments exist both for and against allow-
ing such damages.
3. The Offset Approach
A third approach, apparently an effort to mitigate the un-
fairness of placing the whole burden of raising the child upon the
physician, permits recovery of only those child rearing costs which
are in excess of the benefits of parenthood.' 49 In Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic,'50 the court felt
compelled to conclude that where the parents of an unplanned,
healthy child choose to include this item of damages in their
claim, hopefully after being advised to the psychological conse-
quences which could result from litigating such claim, we will
permit them to recover the reasonably foreseeable costs of rear-
ing, subject to an offset for the value of the benefits conferred
to them by the child."'
This approach is based on the "benefits" rule of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 920, which provides that a court
may reduce the plaintiff's recovery if the defendant can show that
his conduct "has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the
plaintiff that was harmed."' 52 The purpose of the rule is to pre-
vent a "windfall" recovery by the plaintiff.'53
Clearly, the valuation problems attendant on this approach are
overwhelming.'14 Damages occasioned by the rearing of an unplanned
1,, See Robertson, supra note 101, at 153.
See Anonymous v. State, 366 A.2d 204 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976); Troppi v. Scarf,
187 N.W.2d at 517-18.
,So 260 N.W.2d at 169.
' d. at 176.
152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to
his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of
the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered
in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
Note, supra note 132, at 1324.
" [Aldoption of the 'benefits rule' . . . would present insurmountable
problems of proof .... Proof could undoubtedly be offered regarding the cost
TORTS
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child are extremely speculative." I Problems exist as to what stan-
dard of living should be used: the community's average standard
of living, the parents' accustomed standard of living, or some other
benchmark.' 5 6 The valuation of the benefits derived as a result of
parenthood are even more difficult.' 7
Another argument often raised in this context concerns the
mitigation of damages.'" In the strict legal sense the plaintiff must
mitigate damages in order to recover, but the idea of requiring a
plaintiff to mitigate the damages caused by bearing a child by
aborting the pregnancy or by placing the child for adoption is
repugnant, and contradicts an evinced interest in family stability.
It would clearly be unreasonable to require the plaintiff to take
steps which might cause additional physical or emotional injury.
4. Complete Recovery
The fourth approach taken by courts is to allow recovery for
all the costs of raising the child but without the offset of benefits.'59
This approach views the purpose of compensation "not for the so-
called unwanted child or 'emotional bastard'... but to replenish
the family exchequer so that the new arrival will not deprive the
other members of the family of what was planned as their just share
of the family income."' 6
of care and maintenance for a hypothetical child, although the standard of liv-
ing and extent of education to be provided such child would undoubtedly require
considerable conjecture and speculation by the trier of facts.
.... IT]he satisfaction, joy and companionship which normal parents have
in rearing a child ... [are] impossible to value in dollars and cents.
Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d at 127-28. But see Robertson, supra note 101, at 153 (objec-
tive cost standard should be employed).
," See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d at 127-28. Some courts have considered this fact
as sufficient grounds to deny recovery. See Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d at 12.
156 See Robertson, supra note 101, at 153. See also note 154 supra.
'" The question of valuing damages in a wrongful birth action is also discussed in
Note, Sterilization and Family Planning: The Physician's Civil Liability, 56 GA. L. Ray.
976 (1967-68); Comment, Busting the Blessing Balloon: Liability for the Birth of an
Unplanned Child, 39 ALE. L. REv. 221 (1974-75); Comment, Pregnancy After Steriliza-
tion: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J. F~A. L. 635 (1972-73).
"' See, e.g., Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d at 867.
ISO See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
160 Id. at 477.
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Of the four options considered, the first and fourth seem so
unfair to either plaintiff or defendant that they are undesirable.
Of the remaining options, recovery of direct birth costs only, the
approach taken by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Schork v.
Huber6' best serves considerations of law and policy.'62
Although the Court stated that "[tihe establishment of a cause
of action... [for] wrongful birth is clearly within the purview of
the legislature only,"'' 63 a second statement to the effect that the
injured party could recover subject to policy consideration, 164 leads
to the conclusion that the Court would have allowed recovery for
the direct birth costs had the question been presented.
"1 648 S.W.2d at 861.
'61 The third option, allowing recovery of child raising costs with an offset for damages,
is less desirable than the approach used in Shork because the policy considerations are not
adequately considered. See text accompanying notes 141-48 supra.
6' Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d at 863.
364 Id.
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